The Constitution of India, with its federal framework, allocates legislative, executive, and financial powers between the Centre and the states. However, it does not divide judicial authority, as it establishes an integrated judicial system that enforces both Central and state laws. Although both the Centre and the states are sovereign in their respective domains, effective functioning of the federal system requires maximum harmony and cooperation between them. Therefore, the Constitution includes detailed provisions to govern the various aspects of Centre-state relations, which can be categorized into three main areas:
Articles 245 to 255 in Part XI of the Constitution pertain to the legislative relations between the Centre and the states, along with additional provisions that address this subject. Similar to other federal constitutions, the Indian Constitution separates legislative powers between the Centre and the states based on both territory and subjects. The legislative relations can be divided into four key aspects:
However, there are specific limitations on the territorial jurisdiction of the Parliament:
The Constitution outlines a three-fold distribution of legislative subjects between the Centre and the states, defined in the Seventh Schedule:
From this structure, it’s clear that subjects of national significance and those requiring uniform legislation throughout the country are included in the Union List, while subjects of local importance reside in the State List. The Concurrent List accommodates matters where uniformity is desired but not imperative.
In comparison, the US Constitution enumerates only the powers of the federal government, leaving residual powers to the states. Similarly, the Australian Constitution adopts a single enumeration of powers like the US model. In Canada, however, there is a dual enumeration of powers at both the federal and provincial levels, with residual powers vested in the Centre.
The Government of India Act of 1935 also included a three-fold enumeration of powers, which inspired the present Constitution, although it notably did not assign residuary powers to either federal or provincial legislatures; instead, these powers were given to the Governor-General. In this aspect, India follows the Canadian precedent.
The Constitution ensures the dominance of the Union List over both the State List and the Concurrent List. In the event of overlap, the Union List prevails, as does the Concurrent List over the State List. Therefore, when conflicts arise between Central and state laws on subjects in the Concurrent List, Central
The distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the states is meant to function normally under standard conditions. However, during extraordinary times, this distribution can be modified or suspended. The Constitution grants Parliament the authority to legislate on matters listed in the State List under any of the following five unusual circumstances:
1. When Rajya Sabha Passes a Resolution: If the Rajya Sabha declares that it is necessary for the national interest for Parliament to legislate on a matter in the State List, Parliament gains the authority to do so. This resolution must be supported by two-thirds of the members present and voting, and it remains valid for one year, renewable indefinitely for one year at a time. Laws enacted under this provision become ineffective six months after the resolution lapses. This does not obstruct a state legislature’s ability to legislate on the same issue, but in cases of conflict between state law and parliamentary law, the latter prevails.
2. During a National Emergency: While a national emergency is in effect, Parliament can legislate on matters in the State List, including goods and services tax. Similar to the previous scenario, any laws made in this context become inoperative six months after the emergency ends. State legislatures retain the ability to legislate on the same matters, but again, in the event of any conflict, the law passed by Parliament takes precedence.
3. When States Make a Request: If the legislatures of two or more states pass resolutions requesting Parliament to enact laws on specific matters from the State List, Parliament can legislate accordingly. Such laws apply exclusively to the states that passed the resolutions, although other states can adopt the law later. Once Parliament legislates on this matter, the relevant state legislature loses its power to legislate on that issue, effectively ceding its authority to Parliament, which then becomes the sole entity permitted to legislate on that topic.
Examples of laws enacted under this provision include the Prize Competition Act of 1955, the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976, and the Transplantation of Human Organs Act of 1994.
4. To Implement International Agreements: Parliament has the authority to legislate on matters in the State List to fulfill international treaties, agreements, or conventions. This provision allows the Central government to meet its international obligations.
Examples of legislation passed for this purpose include the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act of 1947, the Geneva Convention Act of 1960, the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1982, and various environmental laws and regulations pertaining to TRIPS.
5. During President’s Rule: When President’s Rule is imposed in a state, Parliament can legislate on matters in the State List relevant to that state. Such laws will remain in effect even after the period of President’s Rule ends. However, the state legislature retains the power to amend, repeal, or re-enact such laws.
Article | Parliamentary Legislation | Process | Other Facts | Status of Laws Made |
Art. 249 | If ‘Rajya Sabha’ passes a resolution stating it is necessary in the ‘national interest’ | Resolution must be supported by 2/3rd of the members present and voting | Resolution remains in force for 1 year; can be renewed any number of times, but each renewal not more than 1 year; State Legislatures can also make laws | Parliamentary law ceases 6 months after the resolution expires; in case of inconsistency, Parliamentary law prevails |
Art. 250 | During National Emergency | No special resolution needed; Parliament can legislate on State subjects | Applies during the period of National Emergency | Laws remain in force for 6 months after the expiry of Emergency; Parliamentary law prevails in case of inconsistency |
Art. 252 | States make a request | Two or more State Legislatures pass a resolution | Other states can adopt the law by passing a similar resolution in their legislatures | Law applies only to those states that passed/adopted the resolution; Can be amended or repealed only by Parliament |
Art. 253 | To implement international agreements, treaties, or conventions | No specific process outlined | Related to external affairs and international obligations | Parliament can legislate even on State subjects to implement treaties |
Art. 356 | When President’s Rule is imposed in a state | Parliament assumes the power to legislate for the state | Applies only to the state under President’s Rule | Laws remain in force even after President’s Rule ends; Can be repealed, altered, or re-enacted by the State Legislature |
Beyond the power of Parliament to directly legislate on state issues during exceptional circumstances, the Constitution also empowers the Centre to exert control over state legislative matters in several ways:
(i) The governor can reserve specific bills passed by the state legislature for the President’s consideration, who possesses absolute veto power over them.
(ii) Bills concerning particular matters in the State List can only be introduced in the state legislature with the prior approval of the President (for instance, bills that impose restrictions on trade and commerce).
(iii) The Centre has the authority to require states to reserve money bills and other financial legislation for the President’s consideration during a financial emergency.
From the aforementioned provisions, it is evident that the Constitution establishes the Centre’s superior position within the legislative framework. In this context, the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1983–88) remarks: “The rule of federal supremacy is a technique to avoid absurdity, resolve conflict and ensure harmony between the Union and state laws. If this principle of Union supremacy is disregarded, the consequences could be detrimental. The potential for interference, conflict, legal chaos, and confusion caused by conflicting laws could bewilder the common citizen. A unified legislative policy and uniformity on significant issues of mutual Union-state concern could be severely impeded. Therefore, the principle of federal supremacy is essential for the effective functioning of the federal system.”
Articles 256 to 263 in Part XI of the Indian Constitution outline the administrative relations between the Centre and the states, along with additional articles that address similar issues.
The distribution of executive power mirrors the distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the states, with a few exceptions. The executive power of the Centre encompasses the entire territory of India, specifically including:
For matters where both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate (i.e., subjects in the Concurrent List), the executive power primarily resides with the states unless a specific constitutional provision or law passed by Parliament assigns that power to the Centre. Consequently, while a law concerning a concurrent subject may be enacted by Parliament, its execution typically falls to the states unless explicitly stated otherwise by the Constitution or Parliament.
The Constitution imposes two restrictions on state executive powers to facilitate the Centre’s uninterrupted exercise of its executive authority. Therefore, the executive power of each state must be exercised in a manner that:
(a) Ensures compliance with laws enacted by Parliament and any existing applicable laws within the state, and
(b) Does not obstruct or adversely affect the exercise of the Centre’s executive power within the state. The first obligation establishes a general duty for the states, while the second imposes a specific requirement that states refrain from hindering the executive authority of the Centre.
Article No. | Subject Matter |
245 | Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the legislatures of states |
246 | Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the legislatures of states |
246A | Special provision with respect to goods and services tax |
247 | Power of Parliament to provide for the establishment of certain additional courts |
248 | Residuary powers of legislation |
249 | Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter in the state list in the national interest |
250 | Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the state list if a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation |
251 | Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament under articles 249 and 250 and laws made by the legislatures of states |
252 | Power of Parliament to legislate for two or more states by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other state |
253 | Legislation for giving effect to international agreements |
254 | Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the legislatures of states |
255 | Requirements as to recommendations and previous sanctions to be regarded as matters of procedure only |
In instances where the Centre’s directions are issued to the states, the executive power of the Centre extends to ensuring compliance with those directions. The nature of this coercion is emphasized by Article 365, which states that if a state fails to comply with or implement any directions given by the Centre, the President may determine that the state’s government cannot operate according to the Constitution’s provisions. Consequently, this situation could lead to the imposition of President’s Rule in the state under Article 356.
In addition to the previously discussed provisions, the Centre is authorized to direct states regarding the exercise of their executive powers in specific areas:
(i) The construction and maintenance of communication systems deemed of national or military importance.
(ii) Measures for the protection of railways within the state.
(iii) Providing facilities for instructing children from linguistic minority groups in their mother tongue at the primary education level.
(iv) Developing and implementing programs for the welfare of Scheduled Tribes in the state.
The coercive authority behind these Central directives, as specified in Article 365, applies in these cases as well.
Legislative power distribution between the Centre and the states is rigid; therefore, the Centre cannot delegate its legislative powers to states, and a single state cannot request Parliament to legislate on state subjects. Although executive power generally follows legislative distribution, this rigid division may lead to conflicts. To address this, the Constitution allows for the mutual delegation of executive functions.
The President can assign certain executive functions of the Centre to a state government with its consent, while a governor may similarly delegate functions of the state to the Centre with approval. This delegation can be either conditional or unconditional.
Moreover, the Constitution permits the Centre to delegate executive functions to states without their consent, but this is done through parliamentary action. Consequently, Parliament can assign powers or impose duties on a state regarding subjects in the Union List, regardless of the state’s agreement. However, state legislatures do not possess this authority.
Overall, mutual delegation of functions can occur through agreement or legislation, with the Centre able to use both methods while states are limited to the former.
The Constitution includes several provisions to foster cooperation and coordination between the Centre and the states:
(i) Parliament can adjudicate any disputes or complaints concerning the use, distribution, and control of waters from inter-state rivers and river valleys.
(ii) The President may establish an Inter-State Council under Article 263 to investigate and discuss shared interests between the Centre and the states. This Council was established in 1990.
(iii) Public acts, records, and judicial proceedings from the Centre and all states must be given full faith and credit throughout India.
(iv) Parliament can designate an authority to facilitate interstate trade, commerce, and interaction, although no such authority has yet been appointed.
In addition to separate public services for the Centre and the states, India has All-India Services, such as the IAS, IPS, and IFS. These services allow their members to hold key positions under both levels of government while serving in various capacities. Although they are recruited and trained by the Centre, the ultimate control of these services lies with the Central government, while immediate oversight rests with the state governments.
The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was replaced by the IAS, and the Indian Police (IP) was replaced by the IPS in 1947, with both services recognized as All-India Services in the Constitution. The Indian Forest Service (IFS) was established in 1966 as the third All-India Service. Article 312 empowers Parliament to create additional All-India Services based on a resolution from the Rajya Sabha.
These three services, despite being distributed across different states, constitute a single service with common rights, status, and uniform pay scales nationwide. Although the existence of All-India Services may seem to infringe upon the autonomy of states under the federal principle, they are justified because they:
(i) Help maintain high administrative standards at both the Centre and the states. (ii) Ensure uniformity in the administrative system nationwide. (iii) Facilitate cooperation and coordination on common interests between the Centre and the states.
While advocating for All-India Services in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar remarked that a dual polity within a federal system typically requires a dual service as well. He emphasized that strategic administrative positions necessitate civil servants of high caliber, and although states have the right to form their own services, an all-India service should exist for strategic roles, recruited based on common qualifications and uniform pay scales throughout the Union.
In the context of public service commissions, the following provisions govern Centre-state relations:
Despite India’s federal structure, it lacks a dual system of justice. Instead, the Constitution establishes an integrated judicial system with the Supreme Court at its apex and state high courts beneath it. This unified court system administers both Central and state laws to minimize procedural diversity.
Judges of state high courts are appointed by the President, with consultations involving the Chief Justice of India and the governor of the state. The President also has the authority to transfer and remove these judges. Additionally, Parliament can establish a common high court for more than one state, as seen with the high courts serving both Maharashtra and Goa or Punjab and Haryana.
The Constitution includes additional provisions that enable the Centre to oversee state administration:
Beyond constitutional mechanisms, extra-constitutional methods promote cooperation between the Centre and the states, which include various advisory bodies and conferences at the central level.
Key non-constitutional advisory bodies involve the NITI Aayog (which replaced the Planning Commission), the National Integration Council, and other councils related to health, local governance, and regional development.
Significant conferences, held either annually or periodically to enhance Centre-state dialogue on various issues, include:
List | Taxation Power |
Union List | Parliament has exclusive power to levy taxes (Total: 13 major taxes) – more remunerative |
State List | State Legislature has power to levy taxes (Total: 18 taxes) – less remunerative |
Concurrent List | No taxation power under normal circumstances. Exception: 101st Constitutional Amendment – special provision for GST, giving concurrent power to both Parliament and State Legislatures |
Residuary Power | Union (Parliament has exclusive power to legislate on residuary matters including taxation) |
Articles Related to Centre-State Administrative Relations at a Glance
Article No. | Subject Matter |
256 | Obligation of states and the Union |
257 | Control of the Union over states in certain cases |
257A | Assistance to states by deployment of armed forces or other forces of the Union (Repealed) |
258 | Power of the Union to confer powers, etc., on states in certain cases |
258A | Power of the states to entrust functions to the Union |
259 | Armed Forces in states in Part B of the First Schedule (Repealed) |
260 | Jurisdiction of the Union in relation to territories outside India |
261 | Public acts, records, and judicial proceedings |
262 | Adjudication of disputes relating to waters of interstate rivers or river valleys |
263 | Provisions relating to an inter-state Council |
The Constitution of India makes a clear distinction between the authority to levy and collect taxes and the authority to allocate the revenue generated from those taxes. For instance, while income tax is levied and collected by the Centre, its proceeds are shared between both the Centre and the states.
Additionally, the Constitution imposes specific restrictions on the taxing powers of the states:
1. Limits on Professional Taxes: A state legislature can impose taxes on professions, trades, callings, and employments, but the total annual tax payable by any individual cannot exceed ₹2,500.
2. Prohibition on Certain Taxes: States are prohibited from taxing the supply of goods or services in two scenarios:
When such supply occurs outside the state.
When the supply happens in the course of import or export. Furthermore, Parliament has the authority to set principles for determining when a supply occurs outside the state or during import/export.
3. Electricity Taxation: States can impose taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity, but they cannot tax electricity that is (a) consumed by the Centre or sold to the Centre, or (b) used for the construction, maintenance, or operation of any railway by the Centre or railway company.
4. Water and Electricity Taxation: States may levy taxes on water or electricity that is stored, generated, consumed, distributed, or sold by any authority established by Parliament for the regulation or development of inter-state rivers or river valleys. However, such legislation must be reserved for the President’s consideration and require his assent to be effective.
The 80th Amendment Act of 2000 and the 101st Amendment Act of 2016 brought significant changes to the distribution of tax revenues between the Centre and the states.
The 80th Amendment was enacted to implement the recommendations of the 10th Finance Commission, which proposed that 29% of the total income from specific central taxes and duties be allocated to the states. This “Alternative Scheme of Devolution” retroactively took effect from April 1, 1996, and adjusted taxes like Corporation Tax and Customs Duties to align with Income Tax regarding their distribution to states.
The 101st Amendment introduced a new tax regime known as the Goods and Services Tax (GST). It granted concurrent taxing powers to both Parliament and the State Legislatures for levying GST on transactions involving the supply of goods and services. The GST replaces several indirect taxes imposed by both Union and State Governments and aims to eliminate the cascading effect of taxes, creating a unified national market. This Amendment subsumed various central indirect taxes like Central Excise Duty, Service Tax, and others, as well as state taxes such as Value Added Tax/Sales Tax and Entertainment Tax, among others. It also repealed Article 268-A and Entry 92-C in the Union List related to service tax.
After these amendments, the current position regarding the distribution of tax revenues is as follows:
A. Taxes Levied by the Centre but Collected and Appropriated by the States (Article 268): This includes stamp duties on financial instruments such as cheques and insurance policies, with proceeds assigned to the respective states and not included in the Consolidated Fund of India.
B. Taxes Levied and Collected by the Centre but Assigned to States (Article 269): This includes taxes on sales or purchases of goods during inter-state commerce and taxes on goods consignments in inter-state trade. The net proceeds from these taxes are assigned to the states based on principles set by Parliament.
C. GST in Inter-State Trade (Article 269-A): GST on inter-state transactions is levied and collected by the Centre but shared with the states according to guidelines established by Parliament upon recommendations from the GST Council. Parliament can also set rules to determine where the supply occurs in inter-state commerce.
D. Taxes Levied and Collected by the Centre but Distributed between the Centre and the States (Article 270): All taxes and duties listed in the Union List, excluding those specified in Articles 268, 269, and 269-A, fall into this category. Distribution of the net proceeds of these taxes is determined by the President based on recommendations from the Finance Commission.
E. Surcharges on Certain Taxes for Centre (Article 271): Parliament can impose surcharges on taxes mentioned in Articles 269 and 270. The income from these surcharges is exclusively allocated to the Centre, meaning states do not share in this revenue. Notably, surcharges cannot be applied to GST.
F. Taxes Levied and Collected and Retained by the States: These taxes, which exclusively belong to the states, are specified in the State List and include 18 items, such as land revenue, agricultural income taxes, excise duties on alcoholic beverages, electricity taxes, and several others related to local and state-level revenues.
The major sources of non-tax revenues for the Centre include:
The principal sources of non-tax revenues for the states comprise:
Article | Levy | Collect | Assigned To | Example / Notes |
268 | Centre | States | States | Stamp duties on bills of exchange, promissory notes etc. (Not part of Consolidated Fund of India) |
269 | Centre | Centre | States | Taxes on inter-state trade and commerce (Not part of CFI) |
269A | Centre | Centre | Shared between Centre and States | GST on inter-state trade; Division of revenue is determined by Parliament on recommendation of GST Council; based on principle of supply |
270 | Centre | Centre | Shared between Centre and States | All taxes in Union List (except Articles 268, 269, 269A, surcharges under 271, and cesses); Distribution based on Finance Commission recommendation, prescribed by President |
271 | Centre | Centre | Centre | Surcharges on taxes under Articles 269 and 270; GST is exempted from surcharge |
State taxes | State | State | State | Taxes exclusively for states (Total: 18) e.g., Land Revenue, Agricultural Income, Professional Tax |
Additionally, the Constitution provides specific grants aimed at promoting the welfare of scheduled tribes or improving administration in scheduled areas within states, including Assam. Statutory grants under Article 275, both general and specific, are awarded based on the Finance Commission’s recommendations.
Type of Grant | Constitutional Article | Key Features | Examples / Notes |
Statutory Grants | Article 275 | – Given by Parliament to States needing financial assistance (not to all) – Two types: General & Specific (e.g., for tribal welfare) – Charged on Consolidated Fund of India – Given on recommendation of Finance Commission | Example: Grants to promote the welfare of Scheduled Tribes |
Discretionary Grants | Article 282 | – Both Centre and States empowered to give grants for any public purpose – Discretionary in nature – Not necessarily based on Finance Commission – Can be given for temporary needs | Example: Grants in lieu of export duties on jute to Assam, Bihar, West Bengal, and Orissa |
Other Grants | – | – May include temporary or situational grants – Often tied to specific circumstances or policy decisions – May still be charged on Consolidated Fund and follow FC recommendations | Often used for transitional arrangements or to address regional imbalances |
To ensure efficient management of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), cooperation between the Centre and the states is crucial. The 101st Amendment Act of 2016 established the Goods and Services Tax Council under Article 279-A.
The GST Council serves as a joint forum for the Centre and the states, making recommendations on various matters, including:
To safeguard the financial interests of states, the Constitution mandates that certain bills can only be introduced in Parliament with the President’s recommendation:
The term “tax or duty in which states are interested” refers to taxes or duties whose entire or partial net proceeds are assigned to a state or on which payments are made from the Consolidated Fund of India to any state.
The phrase ‘net proceeds’ refers to the revenue from a tax or duty after deducting collection costs. The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India is responsible for certifying the net proceeds of any tax or duty in a given area, and their certification is final.
The Constitution outlines specific provisions regarding the borrowing powers of the Centre and the states:
Corporations or companies established by the Central government are not exempt from state or local taxation, as these entities are considered separate legal persons.
Notably, local authorities within a state do not receive immunity from Central taxation. Similarly, the Centre can tax properties and incomes generated by corporations and companies owned by a state.
The Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion (1963), indicated that the immunity granted to states against Central taxation does not apply to customs duties or excise duties. Therefore, the Centre retains the right to impose customs duties on goods exported or imported by states, as well as excise duties on goods produced or manufactured by them.
Under a financial emergency proclaimed pursuant to Article 360, the Centre can issue directions to the states to:
Until 1967, relations between the Centre and the states were relatively smooth, largely due to the dominance of a single party, the Congress, both at the Centre and in most states. However, the 1967 elections marked a significant shift when the Congress party was defeated in nine states, weakening its position at the national level. This political change ushered in a new phase characterized by heightened tensions in Centre-state relations. Non-Congress governments in various states began to oppose the increasing centralization of power and intervention by the Central government, advocating for greater state autonomy and more financial resources. This shift led to conflicts and tensions in their interactions.
Several issues have contributed to tensions and conflicts between the Centre and the states, including:
These contentious issues have been under discussion since the mid-1960s, leading to various developments.
In 1966, the Central government established a six-member Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) chaired by Morarji Desai, followed by K. Hanumanthayya. One of its objectives was to examine Centre-state relations. To delve into the complex issues surrounding these relations, the ARC formed a study team led by M.C. Setalvad. Based on the team’s findings, the ARC prepared its report, submitted to the Central government in 1969, which presented 22 recommendations aimed at improving Centre-state relations. Notable recommendations included:
Despite these recommendations, no actions were taken by the Central government to implement the suggestions of the ARC.
In 1969, the Tamil Nadu Government, led by the DMK, established a three-member committee chaired by Dr. P.V. Rajamannar to review Centre-state relations and recommend constitutional amendments aimed at enhancing state autonomy. The committee submitted its report in 1971, identifying several factors contributing to the prevailing unitary trends, or centralization, in the country, including:
Key recommendations from the Rajamannar Committee included:
Despite the significance of these recommendations, the Central government ignored the Rajamannar Committee’s proposals.
In 1973, the Akali Dal adopted the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which articulated both political and religious demands during a meeting in Punjab. The resolution called for a limitation of the Centre’s jurisdiction to matters of defense, foreign affairs, communications, and currency, proposing that all residuary powers should be vested in the states. It emphasized the need for the Constitution to be genuinely federal, ensuring equal authority and representation for all states at the Centre.
In 1977, the West Bengal Government, led by the Communists, submitted a memorandum to the Central government proposing several changes to Centre-state relations. The memorandum recommended that:
Despite these proposals, the Central government did not act on the memorandum’s demands.
In 1983, the Central government established a three-member Sarkaria Commission on Centre-state relations, chaired by former Supreme Court judge R.S. Sarkaria. The Commission was tasked with reviewing the existing arrangements between the Centre and states and proposing necessary changes. Although initially given one year to complete its work, its term was extended four times, and the report was submitted in 1988.
The Commission did not advocate structural changes, believing that the existing constitutional arrangements were fundamentally sound. However, it emphasized the need for operational improvements and rejected calls to limit Central powers, arguing that a strong Centre is essential for maintaining national unity and integrity in the face of fragmentation. It noted that excessive centralization could lead to inefficiencies.
The Commission made 247 recommendations to enhance Centre-state relations, including:
The Central government has implemented 180 out of the 247 recommendations made by the Sarkaria Commission, with the establishment of the Inter-State Council in 1990 being one of the most significant actions taken.
In April 2007, the Government of India established the Punchhi Commission, headed by former Chief Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, to examine Centre-state relations in light of significant political and economic changes since the Sarkaria Commission’s last review over two decades prior. The Commission’s terms of reference included:
1. Review Existing Arrangements: The Commission was tasked with analyzing the current arrangements between the Centre and states based on the Constitution, including legislative and administrative relations, the role of governors, emergency provisions, financial relations, economic planning, and resource sharing, particularly concerning inter-state river water.
2. Consider Social and Economic Developments: In making recommendations, the Commission was expected to consider social and economic advancements over the years, especially in the last two decades, and to focus on good governance, national unity, and strategies for enhancing economic growth to combat poverty and illiteracy.
3. Key Areas of Focus: The Commission was to specifically evaluate:
The Commission submitted its comprehensive report in April 2010, spanning 1,456 pages and seven volumes. In preparing its conclusions, the Commission drew extensively from the findings of the Sarkaria Commission, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission. However, the Punchhi Commission diverged from several recommendations made by the Sarkaria Commission in various areas.
The final conclusion of the Commission emphasized that “cooperative federalism” would be central to preserving India’s unity, integrity, and future social and economic development, suggesting that these principles should guide Indian polity and governance moving forward.
The Punchhi Commission, established to address Centre-state relations, made over 310 recommendations upon examining various issues. Here are some key recommendations:
The Punchhi Commission’s report was shared with various stakeholders, including State Governments and Union Ministries, for their feedback on the recommendations. These comments are currently being considered by the Inter-State Council.
The Central government implemented many of these recommendations, notably establishing the Inter-State Council in 1990.
Committees by Centre | Committees / Initiatives by States |
Administrative Reforms Commission | Rajamannar Committee (1969) – Tamil Nadu |
Sarkaria Commission (1983) | Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973) – Punjab |
Punchhi Commission (2007) | West Bengal Memorandum (1977) |